Frederick Taylor and Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945 as a response to Irving

Taylor's book is a distinguishable response to the claims made by David Irving, Alexander McKee and Kurt Vonnegut. This is quite obvious when one considers that his introduction - or in simpler terms a section for an historians aims - specifically mentions these same figures and scornfully cuts down Vonnegut's "account" of the raids as "a figment of the imagination nonetheless." The judgement of Irving and McKee are saved for the 2nd of the 3 Appendices of his book. The 2nd deals with the 'countless' dead in Dresden and offer his opinion on the casualties he does. McKee is dismissed soundly, describing his casualty guesses so, "McKee simply decided to double the number because he didn't think it sound like enough.", a statement considering that if McKee to stated that twice as many died due to the refugee problem. In this he would have to assume that the numbers of refugee equalled or exceeded the original population (3 quarters of a million). This means that the administration would be on it's knees trying to accommodate this improbable influx of bodies, an unlikely situation considering the lack of evidence suggesting this. Taylor's dealing's with Irving involve two myths propagated by Irving, that of the strafing of civilians after the attack{footnote} and of the casualty estimates of the attack that have, rather erroneously, been put forward by Irving. Taylor readily describes Irving as, "a university dropout", Taylor goes on to comment on those of Irving's calibre saying, "Those - still including Irving - who insist in the face of the documentary evidence that the deaths went into six figures."

F. Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury , 2005, pp. 219, 490-95, 504-5, 507

Essay update

David Irving's book, The Destruction of Dresden, is the quite easily the most influential piece of literature on what is now the most controversial topic of the Second World War. Every piece of historiography in relation to the subject of the Dresden raids after his book is either a reaction to his book or misguidedly furthering his claims.

Upon the release of his infamous book, The Destruction of Dresden, the historical and wider community readily gorged themselves on a banquet of facts guided by an ideology that many had seen its apparent death in 1945. The evidence Irving presented formed their arguments whilst they failed to look into Irving's background and see the importance of delving deeper his sources. Kurt Vonnegut gladly quoted the Air Marshall Saundby's introduction of the 1963 edition of Irving's book to draw further comparisons between the dreadful demise of Dresden and the great air campaign of the Vietnam war.¹ Irving's influence is far reaching and spreads into even the Cold War through Vonnegut's work.

David Irving's resounding success was unraveled abruptly by himself upon his venture to sue Penguin Publishing in the Lipstadt trial. This final bombing of his legitimacy as an historian was as grand as the city he portrayed in his book. Once the metaphoric dust had settled new writers, eager to replace the fallen giants place, collected their sources and a new theory has prevailed. It can be quickly surmised as 'Industrial Dresden' quite easily. Frederick Taylor's book Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945 sets out to destroy the myths created by Irving of the raid in more than contemptuous manner.² Taylor not only provides clear responses to Irving's work but also presents figures of the industrial might of Dresden.

Kurt Vonnegut's novel was quite obviously affected by The Destruction of Dresden considering that it goes as far as to quite Irving's book.³ Vonnegut was an American survivor of the bombing and his adoption of Irving's clearly emphasizes the power of history and more importantly the need for an outside perspective to make judgments on historical concerns. Vonnegut's experiences as a POW during the bombing of Dresden, although a valuable insight into the bombing, made him more likely to accept Irving's findings. This should stress the need for distance for an historian from the event they are studying. One must still consider the reception of The Destruction of Dresden at the time of publishing as overwhelmingly favorably.

Perhaps the greatest proponent of Irving's success and greatest influences is his casualty estimations. These led to a wave of anti-British and anti-RAF sentiment throughout the academic and political world. This was fueled further by opposition to the Vietnam War and carpet bombing of Hanoi and the North Vietnam.⁴ Irving makes this statement in his 1999 edition of his book:

“The Germans were still making propaganda capital out of the raids on Dresden, although they were still under-estimating the death troll. The figure current in Berlin government circles was over three hundred thousand, and the Berlin authority responsible for welfare in blitzed cities was conservatively preparing for a final toll of 120,000 to half a million; although the numbers bulldozed into mass graves in Dresden exceeded thirty thousand already, as late as March 1945 a German official propaganda leaflet dropped on Italy still spoke only of the ‘ten thousand refugee children’ who had been killed.”⁵

Here is a prime example of firstly Irving's ideology overshadowing his methodology and the lack of sources available in the DDR in the 1960's. The political situation of Central Europe would have been to condescending of the west – and would be for next four decades – during Irving's time as a researcher in East Germany. The Cold War fear of capitalism prompted the East to hide it's vast archival secrets and in some cases misinform western interlopers, David Irving on of them. Any chance for Dresden's communist overlords to highlight the danger of the capitalist west was seized upon. The most interesting part of this quote is that Irving describes the propaganda ministry as, “under-estimating the death toll.”, which would seem to suggest that Nazi propaganda ministry has failed in it's sole duty: propaganda.

The surprising and if not scary part of this is this edition was published after the Lipstadt trial. This book does however represent a turning point in the debate of Dresden. Past this point no successful publication has advanced the argument David Irving presented in 1963. Approaches to Dresden in the past decade have swung thanks primary to the fail of the USSR. The bounty of evidence buried in East German archives for well over half a century is staggering. It is now known that in all at least 127 factories existed in Dresden.⁶ These factories produced munitions, weapons and equipment for a punch drunk Wehrmacht. Manufacturers such as the Zeiss-Ikon AG had factories producing not just cameras and lenses but also bomb sights and time-delay fuses for Unter-Reichsmarine.⁷

In tune with the current thinking towards Dresden the bomber crews are finally beginning to get the respect they have deserved for such a long time. The unveiling of the statue of Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-chief of the RAF, is assuredly the beginning of this.⁸ Though criticism for the Queen was apparent for dedicating this statue the overwhelming sense of duty to defend the brave men who flew over German cities in the war. Anti-British ideas may have delayed the respect given to these men but they no longer impede a proud minister in the House of Commons or a politically timid monarch in the British Isles.

British heavy bomber crews who flew over Germany have waited 72 years to receive any official medal for they're bravery was due to, in Kevin Wilson's view, “post-war cynicism crept in to peer suspiciously round the corner of a hard-wrested peace.”⁹ However maybe the political influence of Iving's book isn't so bad. The western world, perhaps through guilt caused by the book, has contributed significantly to the restoration of Dresden’s monuments. Irving's ideological goal of restoring German pride may have succeeded in part. The Dresden monuments instead of representing British guilt have come to represent symbols of new European Unity.¹⁰

1K. Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5, Vintage, 2000, pp. 154-155 (originally published 1969, New York)

2F. Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury , 2005, pp. 219, 490-95, 504-5, 507

3Ibid.

4Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5, p.138

5D. Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden, Focal Point, 1999, p. 312 (internet edition)

6Taylor, op. Cit, p.148

7Ibid., page 156

8http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk-news/47568/bomber-command-deserves-its-wwii-memorial-%E2%80%93-and-heres-why 12/07/2012

9K. Wilson, Men of Air The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command,, Phoenix, 2008, p. 398

10N. Lambourne, the Reconstruction of the City's Historic Monuments in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.), Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945, Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 160

Essay Question

As my project has progressed the style and type of question I have set myself has changed.

My original focus, and scribbled notes will confirm this, was on the moral aspects of the bombing. I was foolish enough to philosophically ask the question of should it have happened, which is not an historians job. Further research led me to discover the many angles of debate over the Dresden saga.This led to my first official question as seen in my original proposal: Evaluate different perspectives on the Bombing of Dresden?
Even further reading has led me to one interesting theory that has as of this date been substantiated by all evidence put before me. The theory is thus, All books written about Dresden, at the very least in the English speaking world, are influenced by The Destruction of Dresden by David Irving. This has led to my current and final question which can be seen in the last post.

Further Developments

This is my project so far, it lacks a full, in depth look into some books if at all. I now commence the glorious 5 day plan.

Assess the IMPACT of David Irving's book and the reaction of historians and the community to it.

David Irving's book, The Destruction of Dresden, is the quite easily the most influential piece of literature on what is now the most controversial topic of the Second World War. Every piece of historiography in relation to the subject of the Dresden raids after his book is either a reaction to his book or misguidedly furthering his claims. To say he is not an important figure in the Dresden debate is a gross understatement of the magnitude of Irving's relevancy.

Upon the release of his infamous book, The Destruction of Dresden, the historical and wider community readily gorged themselves on a banquet of facts guided by an ideology that many had seen its apparent death in 1945. The evidence Irving presented formed their arguments whilst they failed to look into Irving's background and see the importance of delving deeper his sources. Kurt Vonnegut gladly quoted the Air Marshall Saundby's introduction of the 1963 edition of Irving's book to draw further comparisons between the dreadful demise of Dresden and the great air campaign of the Vietnam war.¹ Irving's influence is far reaching and spreads into even the Cold War through Vonnegut's work.

Kurt Vonnegut's novel was quite obviously affected by The Destruction of Dresden considering that it goes as far as to quite Irvings book.² Vonnegut was an American survivor of the bombing and his adoption of Irving's clearly emphasizes the power of history and more importantly the need for an outside perspective to make judgments on historical concerns. Vonnegut's experiences as a POW during the bombing of Dresden, although a valuable insight into the bombing, made him more likely to accept Irving's findings. This should stress the need for distance for an historian from the event they are studying. One must still consider the reception of The Destruction of Dresden at the time of publishing as overwhelmingly optimistic.

David Irving's resounding success was unraveled abruptly by himself upon his venture to sue Penguin Publishing in the Lipstadt trial. This final bombing of his legitimacy as an historian was as grand as the city he portrayed in his book. Once the metaphoric dust had settled new writers, eager to replace the fallen giants place, collected their sources and a new theory has prevailed. It can be quickly surmised as 'Industrial Dresden' quite easily. Frederick Taylor's book Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945 sets out to destroy the myths created by Irving of the raid in more than contemptuous manner.³ Taylor not only provides clear responses to Irving's work but also presents figures of the industrial might of Dresden.

Perhaps the greatest proponent of Irving's success and greatest influences is his casualty estimations. These led to a wave of anti-British and anti-RAF sentiment throughout the academic and political world. This was fueled further by opposition to the Vietnam War and carpet bombing of Hanoi and the North Vietnam.⁴ Irving makes this statement in his 1999 edition of his book:

“The Germans were still making propaganda capital out of the raids on Dresden, although they were still under-estimating the death troll. The figure current in Berlin government circles was over three hundred thousand, and the Berlin authority responsible for welfare in blitzed cities was conservatively preparing for a final toll of 120,000 to half a million; although the numbers bulldozed into mass graves in Dresden exceeded thirty thousand already, as late as March 1945 a German official propaganda leaflet dropped on Italy still spoke only of the ‘ten thousand refugee children’ who had been killed.”⁵

The surpising and if not scary part of this is this edition was published after the Lipstadt trial. This book does however represent a turning point in the debate of Dresden. Past this point no successful publication has advanced the argument David Irving presented in 1963. Approaches to Dresden in the past decade have swung thanks primary to the fail of the USSR. The bounty of evidence buried in East German archives for well over half a century is staggering. It is now known that in all at least 127 factories existed in Dresden.⁶ These factories produced munitions, weapons and equipment for a punch drunk Wehrmacht. Manufacturers such as the Zeiss-Ikon AG had factories producing not just cameras and lenses but also bomb sights and time-delay fuses for Unter-Reichsmarine.⁷

In tune with the current thinking towards Dresden the bomber crews are finally beginning to get the respect they have deserved for such a long time. The unveiling of the statue of Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-chief of the RAF, is assuredly the beginning of this.⁸ Though criticism for the Queen was apparent for dedicating this statue the overwhelming sense of duty to defend the brave men who flew over German cities in the war. Anti-British ideas may have delayed the respect given to these men but they no longer impede a proud minister in the House of Commons or a politically timid monarch in the British Isles.

British heavy bomber crews who flew over Germany have waited 72 years to receive any official medal for they're bravery was due to, in Kevin Wilson's view, “post-war cynicism crept in to peer suspiciously round the corner of a hard-wrested peace.”⁹ However maybe the political influence of Iving's book isn't so bad. The western world, perhaps through guilt caused by the book, has contributed significantly to the restoration of Dresden’s monuments. Irving's ideological goal of restoring German pride may have succeeded in part. The Dresden monuments instead of representing British guilt have come to represent symbolsof new European Unity.¹⁰

1K. Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5, Vintage, 2000, pp. 154-155 (originally published 1969, New York)

2Ibid.

3F. Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury , 2005, pp. 219, 490-95, 504-5, 507

4Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5, p.138

5D. Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden, Focal Point, 1999, p. 312 (internet edition)

6Taylor, op. Cit, p.148

7Ibid., page 156

8http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk-news/47568/bomber-command-deserves-its-wwii-memorial-%E2%80%93-and-heres-why 12/07/2012

9K. Wilson, Men of Air The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command,, Phoenix, 2008, p. 398

10N. Lambourne, the Reconstruction of the City's Historic Monuments in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.), Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945, Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 160