Part 2 (Sebastion Cox - The Dresden Raids: Why and How)

       Sebastion Cox's chapter deals, unsurprisingly, with why Dresden was bombed and how it was bombed. At 44 pages it is the largest chapter of the book and is exclusively the content and context of the Dresden bombing. Cox offers interesting insights into the context raid, describing the gloomy atmosphere of the Allied High Command at the time and potential reasons why.
       "....the heady hopes of optimism of the previous summer had been replaced by a distinctly chill air of pessimism. This pessimism was the result of the failure of the Arnhem airborne landings (Operation Garden Market) and the subsequent ability of the German Army to deliver a further temporary, if at the time deeply worrying, reverse to the Allies during the Ardennes offensive. These events suggested strongly that the German capacity for resistance was as yet very far from being overcome." (page 19)
       Once again the thinking of victory in Berlin by Christmas had cursed the allies, who had to face the harsh reality of the Wehrmact's continued defiance despite the inevitability of defeat. The notion that the war was to soon end in Europe is dispelled by Cox, the Ardennes offensive exasperated the frailty of Allied High Command's hope in a quick victory. To place things in retrospect as to the seemingly daunting task ahead of the Allies, Germany would continue to battle the Allies across Germany for another blood-soaked 85 days after Dresden was bombed.
       The Ardennes Offensive highlighted the seemingly insecure hold the Allies had on the German border. In reality the Ardennes destroyed what was left of the offensive capabilities of the German Army, though this was unknown to the Allis at the time.
       Other reasons, as stated by Cox, exist in perpetuating the negative atmosphere of the Upper Echelons of the Allied Command hierarchy.
       "Major-General Frederick Anderson, USSTAF's Deputy Commander Operations, delivered a harangue on the grave danger the jet fighter posed, and postulated a German strength of 500-700 serviceable jet aircraft by June 1945. At the same time the threat posed by the V-2 rockets had not been neutralised, a renewed maritime threat, in the form of schnorkel-equipped submarines had arisen............ In this more downbeat atmosphere after the Ardennes it seemed possible that both air and naval supremacy might yet be challenged by German technological ingenuity." (page 20)
       Cox is making the excellent point that Allied commanders were further depressed by the apparent inexhaustible depths of German military engineering. With the German military possibly rising from its grave to inflict renewed defeats on the Allied forces the continuation of the aerial bombing campaign can seem very reasonable.
       In light of these contextual evidence, the implementation of Operation "Thunderclap" can be seen as a reasonable, be it brutal, reaction to the German armies attempt to reverse the tide of the war. With the recommencing of the Russian offensive in the east attacking east German cities appeared to be targets too irresistible by Bomber Command.
       The question that is next to be raised further along in Cox's chapter is why Dresden was chosen as a target by the RAF.  Cox states this:
       "Dresden was ranked at number twenty in the list of the hundred German towns of leading economic importance to the German war effort......Thus, although Dresden was 80 percent larger than Chemnitz in terms of population, the latter's economic importance on this measure was ranked three places higher at seventeen." (page 54-55)
       So Cox is establishing that Dresden is a significant military target based on British Army Intelligence assessments. Ranked number twenty for economic importance, which was given in 1943 as stated early in the chapter by Cox (page 53) certainly implies that this report was not merely written amongst the frenzy of the final winter to give a legitimate, though fake, excuse for the attack.
       The mention of Dresden as 80 percent larger than Chemnitz, yet is ranked 3 places lower on the rankings is something to consider. Larger cities, as most bomber crews would testify, are significantly easier to bomb due to their size offering a better display on radar. So the desire of Bomber Command to bomb targets based on their economic qualities, rather than the fact that they are just a city, is key to showing the legitimacy of Dresden as a military target.
       However, as Cox explains, Dresden could have been misjudged in the regards of it's military and economic significance.
       ".....targets marked on the 1941 map target map are not necessarily those with most military value, but rather those which can be easily identified from aerial photographs: rail facilities, power stations, barracks and steel and chemical works. Just how inadequate the intelligence picture was is shown by the 1944 edition of the German army high command's handbook of manufacturers of weapons, munitions and equipment, which listed 127 factories in Dresden of sufficient importance to merit their own three-letter manufacturer's code." (page 55)
       So the 1943 report, which is based on the 1941 report, gives Dresden  lower ranking based on the intelligence available to the RAF, which fails to mention the 127 factories (which Cox has gotten from Frederick Taylor's researches) because of their obscurity from the air. Cox is pointing out these factors to promote the argument of Dresden's legitimacy as a target for aerial bombing.
       However one could still raise the issue of intentions, though this is none of my project's business the argument of unknown knowledge that over a hundred factories more than the British knew of can lead to the assumption of did the Allies bomb it on intelligence that portrayed it as a target of much less value.
       Cox also disproves the myth of the once off, cruel raid by saying,
"Despite claims to the contrary, the proportion of incendiaries carried as a percentage of the bomb-load was by no means unusual for a Bomber Command area raid." (page 31)
A perfect way to end this analysis with the busting of another myth of the Dresden bombing as a malicious blow to German culture by a vengeful Coalition of western interlopers. 

Firestorm Analysis Part 1 (Preface)

I should state a few things about Firestorm edited by Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang. It has been a wellspring of information to me and its panoramic assessment of the Dresden Raids is quite admirable. It brings together the perspectives of 10 different writers to consider, "the origin, conduct, and consequences of the raid." (from the blurb)

But onto the Preface, which I am mentioning because it sums up Dresden rather aptly:

"The bombing of Dresden - a city with a pre-war population of 640,000 - remains one of the most contentious episodes in the use of airpower during the Second World War. On the one hand it has been condemned as a war crime, and on the other hand defended as a justifiable, if ruthless, application of military force."

This is the simplest description of the debate of Dresden. As much as I would like to believe that there is a definitive conclusion to the Dresden saga there is not and will not be. This is not necessarily a bad thing, arguments lead to further research which leads to more evidence, allowing the individual to judge for themselves significance of Dresden's destruction on 13th February, 1945.

Slaughterhouse Five Analysis Part 2

       It is fairly important to understand the reasons as to why quotes from David Irving's 'Destruction of Dresden' appear in Vonnegut's book. It is quite difficult to understand why Vonnegut includes both of the quotes. The first quote, by Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker,  is from the foreword and depicts a typical conservative, military view of the bombing campaigns in general. This is followed by the book's seemingly catchphrase "So it goes" which is usually within the book Vonnegut's of referring to the inevitability of life and how one cannot change what has happened.
       The second quote, also from the foreword but by Air Marshal Saundby is much more significant due to the fact it is in tune with Vonnegut's own beliefs.Before I get into an analysis of the Saunby's quote I will attempt to answer the first sentence. As I mentioned yesterday Vonnegut's book was written a year after the Tet Offensive/Battle of Khe San. At this time the American Air Force was operating a bombing campaign against North Vietnamese cities, which could have parallels drawn between that and Dresden. Irving's book was also at this time quite widely accepted throughout the historical community as fact, the Irving vs Lipstadt lawsuit was still over half a decade away and Irving's investigatory skills as a writer (not historian) was not disputed at that point in time. So from this it can be concluded that Vonnegut, who had set out to write a book on Dresden, was possibly adding legitimacy to his viewpoint of the raids by quoting Irving's book which, given the context of the books publication above, seems a logically conclusion for their inclusion.
       But on to Saundby's quote:
       "That it (Dresden raids) was really a necessity few, after reading this book, will believe. It was one of those terrible things that sometimes happen in wartime, brought about by an unfortunate combination of circumstances. Those who approved it were neither wicked nor cruel, though it may well be that they were too remote from the harsh realities of war to understand fully the appalling destructive power of air bombardment in the spring of 1945."
       This is a seriously profound statement being made by both the Air Marshal and Vonnegut. The first sentence does not suggest that the raids didn't happen rather that few people would be believe that the raids caused such devastation upon the city of Dresden. The last sentence of the quote talks of the men in charge of the air campaign, claiming that those who ordered the raid (Arthur Harris is probably being attacked here) did not consider the consequences of bombing a city to its ruins. It also suggests that Bomber Command lost sight of its moral high ground in the wanton attack on civilian centres.
       "The advocates of nuclear disarmament seem to believe that, if they could achieve their aim, war would become tolerable and decent. They would do well to read this book and ponder the fate of Dresden, where 135,000 people died as a result of an air attack with conventional weapons."
       What this quote is implying is simple that Dresden being bombed is worse than atomic weaponry. The figure of 135,000 is quite very wrong that can be seen now as highly inaccurate with the official figures of between 25,000 and 35,000 dead. This is stating that war was brutally horrible before nuclear weapons and so those calling for disarmament should question whether war would be civilised without the atom bomb, which what Saundby has said about Dresden seems to argue with that view considerable.
        As I have already mentioned Vonnegut used these quotes to give legitimacy to his claims of Dresden as a travesty, often describing the war-torn city immediately after the city was destroyed by the RAF and USAAF. Having said this he most assuredly used this to promote his anti-war, hence anti-Vietnam, views and so that he could deal with the ordeal through writing, which he did with his other books when attempting to reconcile with tragic events in his life.
       The problem with using Vonnegut's book in any historical investigation is difficult part from deciphering between the fact and the fiction. It is hard to tell if the events that befall the main protagonist of the book are true, especially when he does not state whether or not they were experienced by him. Slaughterhouse Five is not a historical volume of the Dresden raids, it is fiction and so must be treated that way. It is not a biography of his experiences of the raids, the recollection of it potentially diluted with narrative to further his anti-war opinions must be considered. Despite this it offers an alternate view of the bombings, potentially offering an insight that historians are unable to offer through research and the particulars.

Slaughterhouse Five Analysis Part 1

Continuing on with my assault on the world of literature today's analysis is Slaughterhouse Five.
       By Kurt Vonnegut, it is a novel loosely based on his experiences as a prisoner of war during the bombing of Dresden. Before I critique the book I believe a look into the context Vonnegut's book is quite in order. Slaughterhouse Five was released in 1969 one year after the battle of Khe San, generally believed to be the turning point of the Vietnam War as support for the war waned after the battle. The book's timing couldn't have been better, as it's decidedly anti-war stance favoured war protester's.
        How exactly is the book anti-war? well to quote Vonnegut in his upfront style of writing that contains the usual amount of wit for himself:
"....he raised an eyebrow and inquired,'Is it an anti-war book?'
'Yes,' I said. 'I guess.'
........'Why don't you write an anti-glacier book instead?'
What he meant, of course, was that there would always be wars, that they were as easy to stop as glaciers. I believe that too."(p 3)
       He openly admits, and as it will become apparent, that Slaughterhouse Five is against war and so hence against the bombing of Dresden. Despite this he is realistic, something the hippy movement of the 1960's lacked, in stating that wars happen and continue to happen. This would, if he were a historian, place him under the Greek (Thucydides) concepts of the nature of humanity and that things SIMILAR in history will reoccur, but not in any deep, significant way.
       Vonnegut is very much so against Dresden being bombed, though he uses other texts, be it one he invented, to represent his feelings towards the raids. He mentions the book 'Gutless Wonder' by Kilgore Trout ( A fictional character in more than a few of his books). The book is called Gutless Wonder in an attack on the bomber crews of the the RAF/USAAF, calling the bombing of a civilian city, as he does in his forward manner. He continues his off-sided, be it frightfully witty, condemnation of the bombing;
       "....it (Gutless Wonder) predicted the widespread use of burning jellied gasoline on human beings.
It was dropped on them from airplanes. Robots did the dropping. They had no conscience, and had no circuits which would allow them to imagine what was happening to the people on the ground."(p 138)
       This is straight forward reference to Dresden, considering the mention of incendiary bombs in the raid and Vonnegut's mentioning of Napalm ("jellied gasoline"). Vonnegut consider's the crews that bombed the incapable of understanding the suffering those present in Dresden during the raids (including Vonnegut himself). This paragraph also alludes to the pain, both mentally and physically, that the bombings caused him. This is important because this bitterness is prevalent throughout the book.
       The referral of the bomber crews as robots parallels with the routine like approach to the raid the further callousness of the Air Ministry as the war dragged on, the thought of "Victory by Christmas" was found wanting after the Ardennes offensive.
       Cities as a military objective is also brought up bluntly in the book, be it hard to spot. Though it is a sight bit of an over-reach I still believe it is relevant.
       "Rumfoord was thinking in a military manner: that an inconvenient person, one whose death he wished very much, for practical reasons, was suffering from a repulsive disease."
       As is debated throughout the argument over Dresden, it's legitimacy as a military objective is questioned by Vonnegut. In this quote he is stating that during war, at the very least during the ending of World War Two, Military commanders will conjure up reasons to allow them to kill civilians simply because they were inconvenient to the military.
       David Irving is mentioned in Slaughterhouse Five, which is primarily the one of the reasons I read the book, the other being the first-hand perspective, despite it's absurdness. However, I believe that Irving in this book is a blog on it's own and so this will be all for now.

Moral Combat Analysis Part 2 (Dresden)

       Moral Combat mentions Dresden only briefly, from pages 512 to 514 to be exact. It proffers a militarily viable reason for bombing the city, 

       "Dresden also recommended itself, not only because it contained 130 war-related factories, but because it was already overcrowded with civilian refugees fleeing from further east."
Burleigh is stating quite directly that Dresden was a military target. The thought that such  large city, with it's hub of transport capabilities would go unnoticed for the entire length of the war, especially considering the dangerously, yet limited success of the Ardennes Offensive. Burleigh argues that Dresden did have factories producing materials for the war, a fact he no doubt garnered from the research of Frederick Taylor.  The claim of fleeing civilians as a military target is a rather more tenuous issue. It would be correct to say that Burleigh is arguing bombing a refugee laden city would cause transport and communication problems, hampering the Wehrmact's ability to rage war in the east and so morally bomb-able.
Burleigh estimates between 25,000 and 35,000 people perished in the combined RAF and USAAF raids, a far cry from a certain historians claims and much more in line with modern, conservative casualty figures. But enough of a single sentence.
Burleigh gives the pragmatic view of the old contemporary Arthur Harris in this fairly poignant sentence.
       "Harris thought the criticism the raid had attracted was due sentimentality of Dresden's Glorious past, as epitomised by Meissen porcelain - which the city did not, in fact, produce."
Dresden's illustrious past as the "Florence of the Elbe" is seen by most conservative military historians as a root to the Dresden debate. Non-conservative views of Dresden's bombing point that the extensive damage done to the city's cultural icons and old town centre can not be forgiven by a few proven facts and well sustained arguments of the raids legitimacy. These same people, more regularly referring to themselves as philosophers than historians, are more ready to accept that Dresden is famous for Meissen porcelain yet stalwartly deny that a single war factory could exist in this picture perfect, innocent city.
David Irving once again becomes embroiled in the telling of the Dresden story, which may be his long lasting legacy.
       "The raids on Dresden were not a war crime, since the relevant international laws on aerial bombardment were not codified or ratified until 1977, and they cannot be equated with Nazi crimes against humanity, though some historians have certainly endeavoured to do so with more or less malign intent."
To be colloquial, this is the crux, the nutshell if you will, of Burleigh's opinion, be it limited, of the Dresden raids. the raids can never be consider legally a war crime as they didn't exist in aerial bombing till 1977, and to parallel the bombing of cities to the malicious mass-murdering or the Jewish populations of Europe are as unfounded as they are ludicrous.  Burleigh's end to this statement is his personal opinion that anyone who tries to draw similarities between aerial warfare and a genocide rampage are doing so on the basis of some past prejudice.
I believe that to end this discussion on the Dresden aspects of Moral Combat is this appropriate quote from this book:
       "The brutal reality was that Dresden was just another name on the target board, to which much unjustified retrospective significance has been attached."

Moral Combat Analysis - Part 1 (introduction)

Michael Burleigh has written a rather interesting book on the Second World War. As much as I hate writing in a way to suggest that this is a book review but the occasion demands it. Burleigh aims at an historical view of the moral issues of fighting the Second World War, in fact he says so in his introduction:
       "A lawyer or philosopher would write a different, perhaps more prescriptive book, using the past to dictate present or future conduct in under the guise of writing history, This book is different in that it deals with on-the-spot behaviour, rather than how these things look in armchair-hindsight."
Key example right above here.
Possibly my favourite part of his intro is this rather cynical line where he presents his views on moral relativism (a form of revisionism, which I hate so very, very much).
       "......This exercise in moral relativism (and crude conspiracy theory) is sometimes excused on the grounds that the author is a novelist daringly experimenting with forms that resemble a child's scrapbook. In reality, any half-competent historian would have no difficulty assembling a small book in which Hitler appeared to be defending (German) human rights, or a directory of every leading Nazi's best Jewish friends."
I cannot pretend, neither can anyone else really, at this time that Burleigh is not making a jab, be it in literature, at the ever condemned David Irving. This can be noticed by his mention of Hitler as the directory of Jewish friends as Irving himself did call Hitler the Jews best friend, which is not the most accurate or profoundly intelligent statement made in the history of mankind, unless you are believe in the legitimacy of the Hitler Diaries (Not even I can resist the temptation to slander Irving). Attacking Irving's works and beliefs is not a tremendously hard task, it can be quite very easily likened to swimming down stream. Making a mockery of Irving is in my eyes an easy way to gain credibility for your own work by distancing it from Irving's cesspit of ignorance.
But why should I mention this at all when I'm talking about Dresden? Because Burleigh mention's the Allied bombing campaign one sentence over, and I like making fun of Irving.
".....,some German historians are bent on inculpating Allied bomber crews in war crimes by the not very subtle method of allowing the German terminology of mass murder to leach into this context."
This is Irving and his side of the Dresden argument's methodology.
To summarise this blog Hitler plus six million Jewish murders does not equal the Allied bombing campaign and it's five hundred thousand or so casualties.