Moral Combat Analysis Part 2 (Dresden)

       Moral Combat mentions Dresden only briefly, from pages 512 to 514 to be exact. It proffers a militarily viable reason for bombing the city, 

       "Dresden also recommended itself, not only because it contained 130 war-related factories, but because it was already overcrowded with civilian refugees fleeing from further east."
Burleigh is stating quite directly that Dresden was a military target. The thought that such  large city, with it's hub of transport capabilities would go unnoticed for the entire length of the war, especially considering the dangerously, yet limited success of the Ardennes Offensive. Burleigh argues that Dresden did have factories producing materials for the war, a fact he no doubt garnered from the research of Frederick Taylor.  The claim of fleeing civilians as a military target is a rather more tenuous issue. It would be correct to say that Burleigh is arguing bombing a refugee laden city would cause transport and communication problems, hampering the Wehrmact's ability to rage war in the east and so morally bomb-able.
Burleigh estimates between 25,000 and 35,000 people perished in the combined RAF and USAAF raids, a far cry from a certain historians claims and much more in line with modern, conservative casualty figures. But enough of a single sentence.
Burleigh gives the pragmatic view of the old contemporary Arthur Harris in this fairly poignant sentence.
       "Harris thought the criticism the raid had attracted was due sentimentality of Dresden's Glorious past, as epitomised by Meissen porcelain - which the city did not, in fact, produce."
Dresden's illustrious past as the "Florence of the Elbe" is seen by most conservative military historians as a root to the Dresden debate. Non-conservative views of Dresden's bombing point that the extensive damage done to the city's cultural icons and old town centre can not be forgiven by a few proven facts and well sustained arguments of the raids legitimacy. These same people, more regularly referring to themselves as philosophers than historians, are more ready to accept that Dresden is famous for Meissen porcelain yet stalwartly deny that a single war factory could exist in this picture perfect, innocent city.
David Irving once again becomes embroiled in the telling of the Dresden story, which may be his long lasting legacy.
       "The raids on Dresden were not a war crime, since the relevant international laws on aerial bombardment were not codified or ratified until 1977, and they cannot be equated with Nazi crimes against humanity, though some historians have certainly endeavoured to do so with more or less malign intent."
To be colloquial, this is the crux, the nutshell if you will, of Burleigh's opinion, be it limited, of the Dresden raids. the raids can never be consider legally a war crime as they didn't exist in aerial bombing till 1977, and to parallel the bombing of cities to the malicious mass-murdering or the Jewish populations of Europe are as unfounded as they are ludicrous.  Burleigh's end to this statement is his personal opinion that anyone who tries to draw similarities between aerial warfare and a genocide rampage are doing so on the basis of some past prejudice.
I believe that to end this discussion on the Dresden aspects of Moral Combat is this appropriate quote from this book:
       "The brutal reality was that Dresden was just another name on the target board, to which much unjustified retrospective significance has been attached."