Tuesday, 28 August 2012
Final Post.
Good job everyone on completing the last assessment of the HSC! Everyone should makes sure that they get here by 9am so that you can hand it in.
Evaluation of Others.
Emma Webster:
Has written a wonderful read on Ambrose Bierce and has timed her project perfectly, despite a late start. Although throughout her essay she can become unsure in her judgement Emma still manages to make relevant and succinct points about Bierce's representations of the Civil War.
Thomas Wallace:
You understand the basic principles for the essay and genuinely is interesting and any point you make is important. Your biased nature towards Parenti have lessened as your drafts have rolled off the assembly line, which has benefited your argument immensely. However your time management is not great and I can only hope your inability to construct introductions has been resolved, as they are a lynch pin for any argument.
Nicole Crichton:
You have the best time management of anyone else doing the project and the extra benefit of having something complete for Mr Wright will help you immensely. I cannot comment directly on your essay due to my personal lack of interest for Shakespeare but so long as you have listened to sir all should be well.
Peter Moore:
Your fascination and interest of the Second World War has and will help you complete this task. Your time management is terrible and if you had completed a draft for Mr Wright you could have been at the top of the pack. So long as you remembered the question in your essay you will do fine.
Tatiana Stoffers:
You started off superbly at the beginning of the year with your staggering amount of research. This has put you in a prime position to write at an early stage but unfortunately you squandered quite alot of this time. Your research did however help you here as your essay has come together in a relatively quick manner and the help you have received from sir in the last 24hrs prior to hand in will save you.
Benjamin Goodwin:
You have already had supremely helpful access to Mr Wright and this will ensure a higher quality essay. The Cuban missile crisis is the perfect area for an essay given your enthusiasm. The negatives are that you have left your essay too late to utilise sir's advice and so I am worried that his early help will not be fully used and your potential not reached.
Abigail Fisher:
An essay of BPC is a wonderful thing to do. As a Scotsman he is already, no doubt, portrayed negatively and this essay will be very interesting. From what I can tell your time management has been great and your essay will benefit from the drafts you will have handed in.
Jesse Hyland:
Your extensive access to sir has benefited you and your essay. From what I have seen it is well constructed and you should do you. Your lack of blogs may hinder you as it as prevented us from understanding the evolution of your essay.
That's all people for this blog. If you don't like what I said, tough. Criticise my work on your own blogs if you wish.
Paul Wray.
Has written a wonderful read on Ambrose Bierce and has timed her project perfectly, despite a late start. Although throughout her essay she can become unsure in her judgement Emma still manages to make relevant and succinct points about Bierce's representations of the Civil War.
Thomas Wallace:
You understand the basic principles for the essay and genuinely is interesting and any point you make is important. Your biased nature towards Parenti have lessened as your drafts have rolled off the assembly line, which has benefited your argument immensely. However your time management is not great and I can only hope your inability to construct introductions has been resolved, as they are a lynch pin for any argument.
Nicole Crichton:
You have the best time management of anyone else doing the project and the extra benefit of having something complete for Mr Wright will help you immensely. I cannot comment directly on your essay due to my personal lack of interest for Shakespeare but so long as you have listened to sir all should be well.
Peter Moore:
Your fascination and interest of the Second World War has and will help you complete this task. Your time management is terrible and if you had completed a draft for Mr Wright you could have been at the top of the pack. So long as you remembered the question in your essay you will do fine.
Tatiana Stoffers:
You started off superbly at the beginning of the year with your staggering amount of research. This has put you in a prime position to write at an early stage but unfortunately you squandered quite alot of this time. Your research did however help you here as your essay has come together in a relatively quick manner and the help you have received from sir in the last 24hrs prior to hand in will save you.
Benjamin Goodwin:
You have already had supremely helpful access to Mr Wright and this will ensure a higher quality essay. The Cuban missile crisis is the perfect area for an essay given your enthusiasm. The negatives are that you have left your essay too late to utilise sir's advice and so I am worried that his early help will not be fully used and your potential not reached.
Abigail Fisher:
An essay of BPC is a wonderful thing to do. As a Scotsman he is already, no doubt, portrayed negatively and this essay will be very interesting. From what I can tell your time management has been great and your essay will benefit from the drafts you will have handed in.
Jesse Hyland:
Your extensive access to sir has benefited you and your essay. From what I have seen it is well constructed and you should do you. Your lack of blogs may hinder you as it as prevented us from understanding the evolution of your essay.
That's all people for this blog. If you don't like what I said, tough. Criticise my work on your own blogs if you wish.
Paul Wray.
Evaluation of Myself.
I have handled myself quite well in the execution of the tasks given. The majority of the writing was finished on the weekend past, allowing just the synopsis and the analysis to be done. Frankly my attempt at a 3rd person synopsis was, pitiful. My source evaluation is not spectacular but will suffice given the limited time I allowed myself to have. The essay has come along spectacularly. From the days of my Irving thesis and the subsequent essay that was very subjective, I have come far. My mind has been expanded onto the subject of not just Dresden, but also the entire bombing campaign, and the associated debates about it. I fear that writing a new essay from scratch a week from the due date has played a significant toll on my health, so much that I am glad to be done with it, simply so I can rest.
Bibliography
Bibliography
Addison
and Crang (ed.), Firestorm:
The Bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006
Burleigh,
Moral Combat: A History
of World War II,
HarperPress,
2010
Cox,
The Dresden Raids: Why and How in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.),
Firestorm: The Bombing
of
Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006
Grayling,
Amongst the Dead Cities
the History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombings of
Civilians
in Germany and Japan,
Walker & Company, 2006
http://www.revisionism.nl/Dresden/The-Mad-Revisionist.htm,date
of viewing, 26/1/2012
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTFDLYxh1KU,
viewed: 25/08/2012
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rBCst4hph0
25/08/2012
Irving,
Apocalypse 1945
The Destruction of Dresden,
Focal Point, 1999
Irving,
Hitler's War and the
War Path,
Focal Point, 2002
McKee,
Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox,
Souvenir Press Ltd, 1982,
p.244
Strachan,
'Strategic Bombing and Civilian Questions' in P Addison and JA Crang
(ed.), Firestorm:
The
Bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006
Taylor,
Dresden Tuesday
13 February 1945, Bloomsbury
, 2005
Vonnegut,
Slaughterhouse 5,
Vintage, 2000
Wilson,
Men
of Air: The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command,
Pheonix (imprint of Orion
publishing),
2008
www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/addison.html27/1/2012
www.codoh.com/irving/irving.html
08/2/2012
www.davidirving.8m.com/
26/08/2012
www.fpp.co.uk/
26/08/2012
www.hdot.org/
26/08/2012
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/firebombing-of
dresden27/1/2012
www.ihr.org/jhr/v13/v13n6p12_Raven.html
26/08/2012
8/2/2012
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWdresden.htm
15/02/2012
www.spiegel.de
› English
Site
›
Germany
›
World
War II
28/08/2012
Source Analysis
Source
Analysis:
Apocalypse
1945 The Destruction of Dresden:
David Irving
The
original edition of this book was written in 1963 by David Irving
with the most recent
version
being published in 1999. It details in a sensationalistic manner
the RAF raid on Dresden
on
13th
February, 1945. The purpose of the book is to recount the horrors of
the bombing of Dresden
and
to place the Allied war effort into a light of disrepute. The
strengths of Irving's book is that he
did
conduct interviews with now dead members of the RAF command and He
had exclusive access to East German archives in the middle of the
Cold War.. It's weakness lie in the books lack of objectivity.
Irving's book is incredibly biased towards Nazi Germany and against
the Allies. Irving's sources are also questionable as they often are
derived from, forged documents or lying communist officials.
However it is useful in showing the motives of Irving as a Holocaust
denier as he openly
describes
Dresden as, “the
worst single massacre in European history.” Irving's book is also
useful
for
showing the change in emphasis in history during the 60's to more
post-modernist approach that
valued
human opinion over empirical fact.
Irving's
book doesn't ignore the other side of the debate simply because in
1963 it didn't exist. So it is seen as the starter of the debate and
was for a long time the main source for condemning the bombing of
Dresden and the bombing campaign as a whole.
Firestorm:
The bombing of Dresden, 1945:
edited - Paul D. Addison and Jeremy A. Crang
Firestorm
book featuring a collection of historical articles by various
historians and edited by Paul D. Addison and Jeremy A. Crang written
to “review the origins, conduct and consequences of the raids.”
It was published in 2006 to offer readers a broad view of opinions
from authorities on the bombing of Dresden.
The
book allows Historians from other fields to examine the raids and
each article deals with a different aspect of the raid including its
consequences and the debate over it. It is great for giving a rough
idea of what occurred of the raid and more importantly, the raid.
Objectivity is a strong part of this source as it allows the reader
to make an informed decision by offering so many different
perspectives to the argument. The source is limited however as the
ideas mentioned in the various articles can only be explained in a
sparse amount of detail requiring other sources to compliment it.
With
a chapter titled, “The Post-War Debate” it gives the perfect
summary of of the Dresden debate and an excellent starting point for
research. It contrasts to the first source (Destruction
of Dresden)
as it is written using many different perspectives rather than just a
single one. Firestorm
also contains articles from noted historians not specialising in
Second World War History, notable Hew Strachan who is a World War 1
historian.
Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945:
Frederick Taylor
Ferderick
Taylor's book, published in 2003, is now considered the leading
academic writing on the raids. The main strength of this source is
Taylor's extensive research into German archives in post-Cold War
Europe. Not only this but it has three specifically set aside
Appendices to answer controversial issues raised in Irving's book.
The book is not perfect however as Taylor does not consider those
arguing against him of having a valid point, readily reminding
readers that Irving was a university drop-out and mocking McKee's
casualty estimates.
Taylor's
book has been highly valuable in contrasting Irving's (source 1)
ideas and theories, allowing the question to be based around the two.
The use of the three Appendices is highly useful as the information
is already organised into a form benefiting the essay. The source is
incredibly reliable as it is based on well researched evidence shown
by the extensive list of references. Taylor also, unlike Irving,
considers the work of other historians and uses them to compliment
his own (an example being (Jorg Bergander).
Final Essay Copy.
Paul
Wray
Two
Tales of One City: The Dresden Debate
A Discussion of the Perspectives on the Bombing
of Dresden.
With
reference to David Irving, Frederick Taylor and other relevant
historians and writers, discuss the different perspectives in the
debate over the Bombing of Dresden.
The
concept of Dresden as a contextual oddity stems from the belief that
by February 1945 World War II was over. Dresden was long considered a
target that was destroyed by just a single air raid. Chosen at a time
when the war was winding down. Irving makes the bold claim that
Dresden was “The Virgin Target” in The
Destruction of Dresden
as a chapter name. This is done to further highlight the contextual
contrast between the bombing of Dresden and the rest of the bomber
war. Irving
doesn't ignore other raids on the city but minimizes their impact and
severity,
stating, “The
local inhabitants unanimously agreed among themselves
that the bombing was the result of some unfortunate oversight by an
allied navigator.”1
Irving
argues in hindsight that Dresden was bombed in the last moments of
World War II. Irving forgets to mention the Ardennes offensive, one
of the main reasons for the renewed bomber offensive. The best he
mentions is that, “When Stalin had failed to launch his major
winter offensive during Hitler’s attack in the Ardennes, the Allies
had sent to Moscow Eisenhower’s deputy.”2
Irving downplays the seriousness of the war, acknowledging the
existence and impact of Schnorkel submarines, the ME-262 or the V.2
rockets but fails to see the affect they would have on the Allied
strategy.3
Irving understates the context of the time to fit his goal of
creating guilt in the British psyche whilst at the same time being
generating sympathy for Germany. This is seen in his many negative
portrayals of Arthur Harris, calling him at on point “'butcher'
Harris.”4
Dresden
is shown as an attack warranted by it's context in Frederick Taylor's
book, Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945.
Frederick Taylor emphasizes the importance and magnitude of the
previous raids. Taylor recounts the previous raids to show that the
populace did in fact expect a raid and that the final bombing was
consistent with other cities. He describes the first raid on August
24th,
1944 as being the reason, “'Trust in the leadership is diminishing
rapidly.'”5
proposing that residents were beginning to suspect themselves as
targets, contrary to Irving. Taylor also describes the second raid on
the city in a similar manner to further his idea that the main attack
on Dresden was not a surprise for the populace as, “This was the
111th
raid alarm of the war... the trek down to into the shelter was not to
be in vain.”6
The much heavier raid on the January 16th
which killed over 300 people also illustrated that Dresden had been a
target for a much longer time than Irving suggested.7
Sebastian
Cox, in his article in Firestorm:
The Bombing of Dresden, 1945
titled 'The
Dresden Raids: Why and How' puts the raids into political and
military context. Cox offers interesting insights into the context of
the raid, describing the gloomy atmosphere of the Allied High Command
at the time and outlining potential reasons why.
"....the
heady hopes of optimism of the previous summer had been replaced by a
distinctly chill air of pessimism. This pessimism was the result of
the failure of the Arnhem airborne landings (Operation
Garden Market) and
the subsequent ability of the German Army to deliver a further
temporary, if at the time deeply worrying, reverse to the Allies
during the Ardennes offensive. These events suggested strongly that
the German capacity for resistance was as yet very far from being
overcome.”8
The
Allies
had to face the Wehrmacht's continued defiance despite the
inevitability of defeat. The notion that the war was to soon end in
Europe is dispelled by Cox. The Ardennes offensive, along with the
failure of Operation Garden Market, exasperated the frailty of Allied
High Command's hope in a quick victory.
Cox shows further problems faced by Allied High Command by
highlighting the “...the grave danger the jet fighters posed”9
and “a
renewed maritime threat, in the form of schnorkel-equipped submarines
had arisen.”10
These prospects of a new and reinvigorated war meant it was,
“possible that both air and naval supremacy might yet be challenged
by German technological ingenuity."11
Cox's argument against Irving places emphasis on sentient empathy to
understand the nature of the raid and why it occurred.
David
Irving made a poignant case in 1963 that Dresden was not a military
target, referred to by A.C Grayling as”seemingly arbitrary
attacks.”12
He presents Dresden as being a weakly defended city, economically
based on, “theatres,
museums, cultural institutions and home-industries.”13
and that they were impossible to spot by air, “...it would have
been hard to single out any one plant of major importance.”14
Irving's claim of an industry-weak Dresden is not as holistic as it
seems, as he relents and states that munitions as well as Junker and
V.2 manufacturing firms existed but assures that, “None of these
plants... was within three miles of the city centre, or within the
area marked out for R.A.F. Bomber Command’s two devastating night
attacks.”15
All of these claims were based on evidence from prior to 1963, which
were unreliable.
Irving
dismisses the official claims of the RAF that it was seen as a major
transport link. Irving believed that, “At the time of the attack,
however, the city’s strategic significance was less than marginal”16
He based his argument on selective evidence at the time which shows
that the raids had minimal impact on the city.
“Rail
transport through the
city – the ostensible target of the raids – had barely suffered,
confirmed the police chief. Although traffic had halted for a few
days, by the end of the month the trains were rolling through
again.23
Years
later, the east German (Soviet zone) history of the destruction and
reconstruction of Dresden stated: ‘The railroad lines were not
particularly seriously damaged; an emergency service was able to
repair them so swiftly that no significant dislocation of traffic
resulted.’ After referring to the devastation wrought on the city’s
architectural treasures the history continued that ‘in contrast to
these cultural monuments and the entire Dresden inner city, these
transport installations were not destroyed.....”17
Although
the initial damage had caused traffic to halt briefly the rail yards
were unscathed compared to the destruction that had been hoped
according to Irving. However several problems arise in these claims.
His information was based off unreliable Soviet sources and didn't
consider that the attack was still a legitimate target, as Bomber
Command had still aimed for them.
The
question of the city's vital infrastructure as being unaffected is
stressed by Alexander
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view and his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view and his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
The
theory of Dresden as an industrial target is currently lead by
Frederick Taylor who provides it as the reason Dresden was bombed. He
describes the work done by those before him as unjustly causing
“unmitigated shame”23
He redicles the perception that Dresden didn't have war industries in
Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945
saying, “The notion that Dresden, a city of almost three-quarters
of a million hardworking human beings in one of the oldest industrial
regions of Europe, concerned itself only with harmless pottery.”24
Taylor provides evidence that Dresden was a target, “the city of
Dresden contained 127 factories that
had been assigned their own three-letter manufacturing codes,”25
and using the details of converted factories assumes that, “Dresden
quickly followed the rest of Germany into an integrated war
economy.”26
Cox
writes similarly that: Dresden was ranked at number twenty in the
list of the hundred German towns of leading economic importance to
the German war effort.27
Grayling
offers a philosophical approach to the legitimacy of the raid from a
moral view point. Grayling makes a clear point about bombing
civilians proffering the idea that, “Allied bombing in the Second
World War was on a whole or part morally wrong,”28
challenging the notion that war creates forgivable necessities.
Grayling uses the memo from Winston Churchill's minute on the 28th
of March that stated, “..I feel the need for more precise
concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and
communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than mere
acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.”29
He uses this to show the immediate reactions of Churchill to the
bombing of Dresden which shows that it was a moral issue from the
beginning, however this completely ignores the context of the from a
military view point.
The
bombing of Dresden is likened to the blockade of WWI in Hew
Strachan's article, “Strategic Bombing and Civilian Casualties”
in which he shows that both were a part of total war. As such, “It
defined not only what would be required of one's own population, but
what one could inflict on the enemy's.”30
He makes it clear that the WWI blockade was worse than the bomber
campaign as “600,000 died, fewer than were reckoned to have
succumbed to the navy's blockade in the First World War.”31
Hence Strachan concludes that Dresden is not
a war crime as contextually the blockade and air offensive had the
same objective of fighting an enemy engaged in total war, and offers
a legitimate opinion based on his work as a WW1 historian.
The
actual attack on Dresden was, according to Irving, specifically
significant and different from other bombings. The bomb load was,
“Unlike
most of the air raids on German targets at this stage of the war, the
force was
carrying about seventy-five percent incendiaries.”32
This is a phenomenal claim to make but with the restriction of
wartime documents relating to Dresden Irving couldn't be disproved.
Another claim he makes is that:
“Mustangs
concentrated on the river banks, where masses of bombed out people
had gathered. Another section took on the targets in the Grosser
Garten area. These strafing attacks were apparently designed to
perfect the task outlined in the air commanders’ directives as
‘causing confusion in the civilian evacuation from the east.’”33
Irving
is claiming that P-51 Mustangs deliberately attacked civilians after
the raids. More importantly he implies that they were under direct
orders from allied high command as they were following the “air
commanders' directives” in carrying out the attack. Irving
substantiates his claims with eye-witness testimonies such as, “The
fighter aircraft came right down and a woman near us suddenly
screamed out, shot in the stomach.”34
and of a Breslau refugee at the Leipziger Strasse rail bridge saying,
“We could hear the aircraft diving low and then they began firing
from all their guns. We
were
fortunate, we were able to crawl into a doorway.”35
Irving does consider the fallibility of memory however and adds as a
side note that “(U.S. Air Force historians have pointed out,
‘Nothing in the records can be found to substantiate such claims,’
and it is only fair to record this.)”36
Kurt Vonnegut in his surreal book
Slaughterhouse 5
exaggerates the heartlessness of the bomber crews stating that,
“...the
widespread use of burning jellied gasoline on human beings. It was
dropped on them from airplanes. Robots did the dropping. They had no
conscience, and had no circuits which would allow them to imagine
what was happening to the people on the ground."37
Vonnegut's book is heavily
influenced by his presence during the raids as a POW and by his
anti-Vietnam War stance. Vonnegut's context and trust in Irving's
book prevented him from considering other perspectives.
The
incendiary claims have been ridiculed by most modern historians as
being unsubstantiated. Cox counters Irving's claim of a higher
proportion of incendiaries as"Despite
claims to the contrary, the proportion of incendiaries carried as a
percentage of the bomb-load was by no means unusual for a Bomber
Command area raid."38
and
bases this off Air Historical Branch papers that show, “Dresden
ranked only tenth in terms of the percentage of incendiaries used
with 44 percent.”39
Cox can do this because of the release of Air Ministry documents
after the war's end, which were unavailable to Irving and so Cox is
correcting past histories.
The
P-51 strafing runs are attacked by Taylor who proves that they are
insubstantial. He shows that the strafing could not have happened
above Dresden as, “the Twentieth Fighter Group was....at the time
more than eighty miles away escorting the attack not against Dresden
but Prague.”40
Taylor continues to attack Irving's claims stating that, “...nor -
perhaps more significantly – in German accounts originating at the
time are such daylight strafing attacks mentioned.”41
This new information was discovered after the Soviet bloc fell and
allowed historians to reveal the true extent of the raids and
progress history on Dresden.
The
most controversial aspect of the debate is the casualty figures and
their implications. David Irving estimated in 1963 that 135,000
people had died in the raids based on a report from Hans Voigt.42
However Irving was forced to retract this statement in latter
editions as, “the author felt bound to submit to The Times an
immediate letter drawing attention
to these new documents...”43
In his 1999 edition he makes a final estimate of, “Sixty thousand
or more; perhaps a hundred thousand – certainly the largest single
air raid massacre of the War in Europe.”44
However Irving contradicts himself over the figures also stating,
“The night’s
death toll in Dresden was estimated to him at a quarter of a
million.”45
These figures allow
Irving to draw comparisons between Hiroshima stating, “(The
raid was thus comparable with...the atomic bombing of Hiroshima five
months later...”46
and more importantly the Holocaust so that he can place Dresden in a
'class' of it's own. This is so he can elicit sympathy for Germans
whilst depicting the Allies as monstrous.
In
his book Hitler's
War and the War Path,
Irving refers to Dresden as, “the
holocaust of Dresden”47
Irving deliberately uses his rhetoric describing the casualty figures
so that they can parallel the historical status of the Holocaust. In
a lecture in 1988 Irving states, “...the biggest lie that we
propagated as far as I can see was the gas chamber lie.”48
Irving at the end of The
Destruction of Dresden
refers to Dresden as “the
worst single massacre in European history.”49
Irving does this to highlight the 'holocaust' brought about on the
Germans in WW2, whilst systematically understating the actual
Holocaust.
Alexander
McKee states that the casualty figures, “...might easily be doubled
to 70,000 without much fear of exaggeration. But no one will ever
know for certain.” However this assessment of casualties does not
consider the administrative strain of dealing with a city that
the numbers of refugee equalled or exceeded the original population
(3 quarters of a million).
McKee's figures are based upon Irving's and are dismissed by Taylor
as, “McKee
simply decided to double the number because he didn't think it sound
like enough."
50
McKee's estimations are flawed as they are based upon a lack of
evidence, highlighting the need for empirical sources.
Most
modern historians believe in a much lower casualty figure for the
bombing of Dresden. The current and accepted figures are between
20,000 and 35,000, figures found due to the opening of East German
archives,
“the
definite figure in those documents, (the
Final Report and Situational Report) were between 18,000 and 22,000,
estimates of final numbers around 25,000...the figures were being
issued as an exceptional measure in order to scotch rumours of
gigantic casualties...”51
The
archives allowed for historians to correct the mistakes of past
writers with new evidence. Taylor describes the argument of other
historians as insisting, “in the face of the documentary
evidence...”52
Michael Burleigh is critical of revisionism on the bomber campaign
and summarises the methodology of Irving and other historians
supporting him, “"...bent on inculpating Allied bomber crews
in war crimes by the not very subtle method of allowing the German
terminology of mass murder to leach into this context."53
The debate over Dresden has had –
and still will have – an impact on the history of bombing in the
Second World War as well as histories of the Holocaust. This is
because it is a rallying point for those who condemn the Allies for
their questionable actions in the war. However new evidence used by
Frederick Taylor has played a great part in rewriting the history of
Dresden whilst David Irving's preconceptions have had a polarising
effect. The debate over the Bombing of Dresden shows that history
changes over time and that subjective history leads to errors in
history.
1D.
Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden,
Focal Point, 1999, p. 90 (internet edition)
2Irving,
Apocalypse, p. 110
3Ibid.,
p.115 (jet and submarine
production)
4Ibid.,
p. 79
5F.
Taylor, Dresden
Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury
, 2005, p. 167 (Quoting a Dresden police officer.)
6Ibid.,
p. 222
7Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
8S.
Cox, The Dresden Raids: Why and How in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.),
Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 19
9Ibid.,
p. 20
10Ibid.,
p. 20
11Ibid.,
p. 20
12A.C.
Grayling, Amongst the Dead Cities the history and moral legacy of
the WWII bombings of civilians in Germany and Japan,
Walker & Company, 2006, p. 73
13Irving,
op. Cit, p. 91
14Ibid.,
p. 91
15Ibid.,
p. 92
16Ibid.,
p. 93
17Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
19Ibid.,
p. 70
20Ibid.,
p. 70
21Ibid.,
p. 10
22Ibid.,
p. 11
23Taylor,
op. Cit, p. xi
24Ibid.,
p. xii
25Ibid.,
p. 169
26Ibid.,
p.170
27Cox,
op. Cit, p. 53
28Grayling,
op. Cit, p. 5
29Ibid.,
p. 175
30H.
Strachan, Strategic Bombing and Civilian Questions in P Addison and
JA Crang (ed.), Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 2
31Ibid.,
p. 17
32Irving,
op. Cit, p. 173
33Ibid.,
p. 237
34Irving,
op. Cit, p. 237
35Ibid.,
p. 238
36Ibid.,
p. 237
37K.
Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5,
Vintage, 2000, p. 138 (originally published 1969, New York)
38Cox,
op. Cit., p. 31
39Ibid.,
p. 223 (end notes)
40Taylor,
op. Cit, p. 491
41Ibid.,
p. 494
42Ibid.,
p. 504
43Irving.,
op. Cit, p.289
44Ibid.,
p.289
45D.
Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path,
Focal Point, 2002, p.789
46Ibid.,
p.289
47Irving,
HW at WP, op. Cit, p.
796
48http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTFDLYxh1KU,
viewed: 25/08/2012, 27:06
49Irving,
Destruction, op. Cit,
p. 324
50Taylor,
op. Cit, p. 507
51Ibid.,
p. 505-6
52Ibid.,
p. 506
53M.
Burleigh, Moral Combat: A history of World War II,
HarperPress, 2010,
pp. x-xi
Completed Synopsis.
'With
reference to David Irving, Frederick Taylor and other relevant
historians and writers, discuss the different perspectives in the
debate over the Bombing of Dresden.'
The
essay question that I chose is based upon interest in allied bombing
of Germany in WW2. My interest been primarily spurred on by Kevin
Wilson's book, Men of Air The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command. It was
chosen after research guided by my Extension teacher who showed me
the variety of sources available. Other sources I discovered
personally. Originally the essay was meant to be an evaluation of the
debate but turned into an argument centrally based around the
influence of David Irvings's book, The Destruction of Dresden.
However I realised I had strayed from my original ideals, and
returned to a 'discuss' question.
Rather than immediately discounting the the views in my sources I have still presented them. This suited the current question as it is a discussion of the views. However, I still retained a sense of judgement, voicing my opinion on them and their flaws. The two sources that drove the essay, and the debate, are David Irving's Destruction of Dresden and Frederick Taylor's Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945. Other sources were used to compliment the theories of each on the various sub topics of the essay. The sources I studied and used show a fairly balanced debate.
I have organised the debate into 4 sub topics; the contextual view of the raid, the legitimacy of Dresden as a target, the legitimacy of the method by which the city was bombed and casualty figures for the raid. I have done this to provide structure to my essay and to easily compare the different perspectives within each subtopic.
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