Assess
the impact of David Irving's book and the reaction of historians and
the community to it.
David
Irving's book, The Destruction of Dresden,
is the quite easily the most influential piece of literature on what
is now the most controversial topic of the Second World War. Every
piece of history in relation to the subject of the Dresden raids
after his book is either a reaction to his book or misguidedly
furthering his claims.
Upon
the release of his, The Destruction of Dresden,
the historical and wider community were presented with history
influenced by ideology. The evidence Irving presented formed future
thought on the raids whilst they failed to look into Irving's
background and see the importance of delving deeper into his sources.
Kurt Vonnegut gladly quoted the Air Marshall Saundby's introduction
of the 1963 edition of Irving's book to draw further comparisons
between the dreadful demise of Dresden and the great air campaign of
the Vietnam war.1
Irving's influence is far reaching and spreads into even the Cold War
through Vonnegut's work.
David Irving's
high level of success was unraveled by himself upon his venture to
sue Penguin Publishing in the Lipstadt trial. This final bombing of
his legitimacy as an historian was as grand as the city he portrayed
in his book. Once the metaphoric dust had settled new writers, eager
to correct the mistaken historiography, collected their sources and a
new theory has prevailed. It can be quickly summarised as 'Industrial
Dresden'.
Frederick
Taylor's book Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945
sets out to destroy the myths created by Irving of the raid in more
than contemptuous manner.2
Taylor not only provides clear responses to Irving's work but also
presents figures of the industrial might of Dresden. Taylor's
book is a distinguishable response to the claims made by David
Irving, Alexander McKee and Kurt Vonnegut. This is quite obvious when
one considers that his introduction - or in simpler terms a section
for an historians aims - specifically mentions these same figures and
scornfully cuts down Vonnegut's "account" of the raids as
"a
figment of the imagination nonetheless."
3
The
judgment of Irving and McKee are saved for the 2nd
of the 3 Appendices of his book. The 2nd deals with the 'countless'
dead in Dresden and offer his opinion on the casualties he does.
McKee is dismissed soundly, describing his casualty guesses so,
"McKee
simply decided to double the number because he didn't think it sound
like enough.".4
A statement considering that if McKee to stated that twice as many
died due to the refugee problem. Logically he would have to assume
that the numbers of refugee equalled or exceeded the original
population (3 quarters of a million). This means that the
administration would be on it's knees trying to accommodate this
improbable influx of bodies, an unlikely situation considering the
lack of evidence suggesting this. Taylor's dealing's with Irving
involve two myths propagated by Irving, that of the strafing of
civilians after the attack and of the casualty estimates of the
attack that have been put forward by Irving. Taylor describes Irving
as, "a
university dropout"5,
and went on to comment on those of Irving's caliber saying, "Those
- still including Irving - who insist in the face of the documentary
evidence that the deaths went into six figures."
6
The simple fact that Taylor set aside 3 appendices (29 pages in all)
to deal with the misconceptions of Dresden specifically proves his
attempt to disprove Irving. This proves that the academic world is
still influenced by Irving's theories as Taylor is answering
supporters of Irving still in 2003.
Kurt Vonnegut's
novel was quite obviously affected by The Destruction of Dresden
considering that it goes as far as to quite Irving's book.7
Vonnegut was an American survivor of the bombing and his adoption of
Irving's clearly emphasizes the power of history and more importantly
the need for an outside perspective to make judgments on historical
concerns. Vonnegut's experiences as a POW during the bombing of
Dresden, although a valuable insight into the bombing, made him more
likely to accept Irving's findings. This should stress the need for
distance for an historian from the event they are studying. One must
still consider the reception of The Destruction of Dresden at
the time of publishing as overwhelmingly favorably.
Perhaps the
greatest of Irving's successes and greatest influences is his
casualty estimations. These led to a wave of anti-British and
anti-RAF sentiment throughout the academic and political world. This
was fueled further by opposition to the Vietnam War and carpet
bombing of Hanoi and the North Vietnam.8
Irving makes this statement in his 1999 edition of his book:
“The
Germans were still making propaganda capital out of the raids on
Dresden, although they were still under-estimating the death troll.
The figure
current in Berlin government circles was over three hundred thousand,
and the Berlin authority responsible for welfare in blitzed cities
was conservatively preparing for a final toll of 120,000
to
half a million; although the numbers bulldozed into mass graves in
Dresden exceeded thirty thousand already, as late as March 1945
a
German official propaganda leaflet dropped on Italy still spoke only
of the ‘ten thousand refugee children’ who had been killed.”9
Here
is a prime example of firstly Irving's ideology overshadowing his
methodology and the lack of sources available in the DDR in the
1960's. The political situation of Central Europe would have been to
condescending of the west – and would be for next four decades –
during Irving's time as a researcher in East Germany. The Cold War
fear of capitalism prompted the East to hide it's vast archival
secrets and in some cases misinform western interlopers, David Irving
on of them. Any chance for Dresden's communist overlords to highlight
the danger of the capitalist west was seized upon. The most
interesting part of this quote is that Irving describes the
propaganda ministry as, “under-estimating the death toll.”, which
would seem to suggest that Nazi propaganda ministry has failed in
it's sole purpose: propaganda.
The
surprising and if not scary part of this is that the 1995 edition was
published after the Lipstadt trial. The trial represented a turning
point in the debate of Dresden. Past this point no successful
publication has advanced the argument David Irving presented in 1963.
Approaches to Dresden in the past decade have swung thanks primary to
the fail of the USSR. The bounty of evidence buried in East German
archives for well over half a century is staggering. It is now known
that in all at least 127 factories existed in Dresden.10
These factories produced munitions, weapons and equipment for a punch
drunk Wehrmacht. Manufacturers such as the Zeiss-Ikon AG had
factories producing not just cameras and lenses but also bomb sights
and time-delay fuses for Unter-Reichsmarine.11
In
tune with the current thinking towards Dresden the bomber crews are
finally beginning to get the respect they have deserved for such a
long time. The unveiling of the statue of Sir Arthur Harris,
Commander-in-chief of the RAF, is assuredly the beginning of this.12
Though criticism for the Queen was apparent for dedicating this
statue the overwhelming sense of duty to defend the brave men who
flew over German cities in the war. Anti-British ideas may have
delayed the respect given to these men but they no longer impede a
proud minister in the House of Commons or a politically timid monarch
in the British Isles.
British heavy bomber crews who flew over Germany have waited 72 years
to receive any official medal for they're bravery was due to, in
Kevin Wilson's view, “post-war cynicism crept in to peer
suspiciously round the corner of a hard-wrested peace.”13
However maybe the political influence of Iving's book isn't so bad.
The western world, perhaps through guilt caused by the book, has
contributed significantly to the restoration of Dresden’s
monuments. Irving's ideological goal of restoring German pride may
have succeeded in part. The Dresden monuments instead of representing
British guilt have come to represent symbols of new European Unity.14
1K.
Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5,
Vintage, 2000, pp. 154-155 (originally published 1969, New York)
2F.
Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury
, 2005, p. 147
3Ibid.,
p. xi
4Ibid.,
p. 507
5Ibid.,
p. 504
6Ibid.,
p. 506
7Vonnegut,
op. Cit, pp. 154-155
8Ibid.,
p.138
9D.
Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden,
Focal Point, 1999, p. 312 (internet edition)
10Taylor,
op. Cit, p.148
11Ibid.,
page 156
13K.
Wilson, Men of Air The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command,,
Phoenix, 2008, p. 398
14N.
Lambourne, the Reconstruction of the City's Historic Monuments in P
Addison and JA Crang (ed.), Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden,
1945, Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 160
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