2nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs

The concept of Dresden as a contextual oddity stems from the belief that by February 1945 World War II was over. Dresden was long considered a target that was destroyed by just a single air raid, chosen at a time when the war was winding down and Irving makes the bold claim that Dresden was “The Virgin Target” in The Destruction of Dresden as a chapter name. This is done to further highlight the contextual contrast between the bombing of Dresden and the rest of the bomber war. Irving doesn't ignore other raids on the city but minimizes their impact and severity, stating, “The local inhabitants unanimously agreed among themselves that the bombing was the result of some unfortunate oversight by an allied navigator.”¹

The above quote fits the other contextual problem that Dresden poses. Irving argues that Dresden was bombed in the last moments of World War II. Irving forgets to mention the Ardennes offensive, one of the main reasons for the renewed bomber offensive. The best he mentions is that, “When Stalin had failed to launch his major winter offensive during Hitler’s attack in the Ardennes, the Allies had sent to Moscow Eisenhower’s deputy.”² Irving downplays the seriousness of the war, acknowledging the existence and impact of Snorkal submarines or the ME-262 but fails to see the affect they would have on the Allied strategy.³ Irving understates the context of the time to fit his goal of creating guilt in the British psyche and at the same time making a world sympathetic to Germany. This is seen in his many negative portrayals of Arthur Harris, calling him at on point “'butcher' Harris.”⁴

Dresden is shown as an attack warranted by it's context in Frederick Taylor's book, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945. Frederick Taylor emphasizes the importance and magnitude of the previous raids. Taylor emphasizes the previous raids to show that the populace did in fact expect a raid and that the final bombing was consistent with other cities. He describes the first raid on August 24^th, 1944 as being the reason “'Trust in the leadership is diminishing rapidly.'”⁵ Taylor also describes the second raid on the in a similar manner to further his idea that Dresden was not a surprise for the populace as, “This was the 111^th raid alarm of the war...... the trek down to into the shelter was not to be in vain.”⁶and the much heavier raid on the January 16^th which killed over 300 people illustrate that Dresden had been a target for a much longer time than Irving suggested.⁷

1D. Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden, Focal Point, 1999, p. 90 (internet edition)

2Irving, Apocalypse, p. 110

3Ibid., p.115 (jet and submarine production)

4Ibid., p. 79

5F. Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury , 2005, p. 167 (Quoting a Dresden police officer.)

6Ibid., p. 222

7Ibid., pp. 230-231