David
Irving made a poignant case In 1963 that Dresden was not a military
target, referred to by A.C Grayling as”seemingly arbitrary
attacks.”1
He presents Dresden as being a weakly defended city, economically
based on, “theatres,
museums, cultural institutions and home-industries.”2
and that they were impossible to spot by air, “...it would have
been hard to single out any one plant of major importance.”3
Irving's claim of a industry-weak Dresden is not as holistic as it
seems, as he relents and states that munitions as well as Junker and
V.2 manufacturing firms but assures that, “None of these plants...
was within three miles of the city centre, or within the area marked
out for R.A.F. Bomber Command’s two devastating night attacks.”4
All of these claims were based on evidence from prior to 1963
Irving
dismisses the official claims of the RAF that it was seen as a major
transport link. Irving believed that, “At the time of the attack,
however, the city’s strategic significance was less than
marginal”5
he based on the evidence at the time which shows that the raids had
minimal impact on the city.
“Rail
transport through the city – the ostensible
target of the raids – had barely suffered, confirmed the police
chief. Although traffic had halted for a few days, by the end of the
month the trains were rolling through again.23
Years later, the east German (Soviet zone) history of
the destruction and reconstruction of Dresden stated: ‘The railroad
lines were not particularly seriously damaged; an emergency service
was able to repair them so swiftly that no significant dislocation of
traffic resulted.’ After referring to the devastation wrought on
the city’s architectural treasures the history continued that ‘in
contrast to these cultural monuments and the entire Dresden inner
city, these transport installations were not destroyed.....”6
Although
the initial damage had cause traffic to halt briefly the rail yards
were unscathed compared to the destruction that had been hoped
according to Irving. However several problems arise in these claims.
His information is based off unreliable Soviet sources and does not
consider that the result does not make it a legitimate target, as
Bomber Command had still aimed for them.
1A.C
Grayling, Amongst the Dead Cities the history and moral legacy of
the WWII bombings of civilians in Germany and Japan,
Walker & Company, 2006, p. 73
2Irving,
op. Cit, p. 91
3Ibid.,
p. 91
4Ibid.,
p. 92
5Ibid.,
p. 93
6Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
No comments:
Post a Comment