With
reference to David Irving, Frederick Taylor and other relevant
historians and writers, discuss the different perspectives in the
debate over the Bombing of Dresden.
The
concept of Dresden as a contextual oddity stems from the belief that
by February 1945 World War II was over. Dresden was long considered a
target that was destroyed by just a single air raid.,Chosen at a time
when the war was winding down. Irving makes the bold claim that
Dresden was “The Virgin Target” in The Destruction of
Dresden as a chapter name. This
is done to further highlight the contextual contrast between the
bombing of Dresden and the rest of the bomber war. Irving
doesn't ignore other raids on the city but minimizes their impact and
severity,
stating, “The
local inhabitants unanimously agreed among themselves
that the bombing was the result of some unfortunate oversight by an
allied navigator.”1
The
above quote fits the other contextual problem that Dresden poses.
Irving argues that Dresden was bombed in the last moments of World
War II. Irving forgets to mention the Ardennes offensive, one of the
main reasons for the renewed bomber offensive. The best he mentions
is that, “When Stalin had failed to launch his major winter
offensive during Hitler’s attack in the Ardennes, the Allies had
sent to Moscow Eisenhower’s deputy.”2
Irving downplays the seriousness of the war, acknowledging the
existence and impact of Schnorkel submarines, the ME-262 or the V2
rockets but fails to see the affect they would have on the Allied
strategy.3
Irving understates the context of the time to fit his goal of
creating guilt in the British psyche and at the same time being
sympathetic to Germany. This is seen in his many negative portrayals
of Arthur Harris, calling him at on point “'butcher' Harris.”4
Dresden
is shown as an attack warranted by it's context in Frederick Taylor's
book, Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945.
Frederick Taylor emphasizes the importance and magnitude of the
previous raids. Taylor emphasizes the previous raids to show that the
populace did in fact expect a raid and that the final bombing was
consistent with other cities. He describes the first raid on August
24th,
1944 as being the reason, “'Trust in the leadership is diminishing
rapidly.'”5
proposing that residents were beginning to suspect themselves as
targets, contrary to Irving. Taylor also describes the second raid on
the city in a similar manner to further his idea that Dresden was not
a surprise for the populace as, “This was the 111th
raid alarm of the war...... the trek down to into the shelter was not
to be in vain.”6
and the much heavier raid on the January 16th
which killed over 300 people illustrate that Dresden had been a
target for a much longer time than Irving suggested.7
Sebastian
Cox, in his chapter of Firestorm:
The Bombing of Dresden, 1945
titled The
Dresden Raids: Why and How
puts the raids into political and military context. Cox offers
interesting insights into the context raid, describing the atmosphere
of the Allied High Command at the time and outlining potential
reasons why.
"....the
heady hopes of optimism of the previous summer had been replaced by a
distinctly chill air of pessimism. This pessimism was the result of
the failure of the Arnhem airborne landings (Operation
Garden Market) and
the subsequent ability of the German Army to deliver a further
temporary, if at the time deeply worrying, reverse to the Allies
during the Ardennes offensive. These events suggested strongly that
the German capacity for resistance was as yet very far from being
overcome.”8
The
Allies
had to face the Wehrmacht's continued defiance despite the
inevitability of defeat. The notion that the war was to soon end in
Europe is dispelled by Cox. The Ardennes offensive, along with the
failure of Operation Garden Market, exasperated the frailty of Allied
High Command's hope in a quick victory.
Cox shows further problems faced by Allied High Command by
highlighting the “...the grave danger the jet fighters posed”9
and “a
renewed maritime threat, in the form of schnorkel-equipped submarines
had arisen.”10
These prospects of a new and reinvigorated war meant it was,
“possible that both air and naval supremacy might yet be challenged
by German technological ingenuity."11
Cox's argument against Irving places emphasis on sentient empathy to
understand the nature of the raid and why it occurred.
David
Irving made a poignant case In 1963 that Dresden was not a military
target, referred to by A.C Grayling as”seemingly arbitrary
attacks.”12
He presents Dresden as being a weakly defended city, economically
based on, “theatres,
museums, cultural institutions and home-industries.”13
and that they were impossible to spot by air, “...it would have
been hard to single out any one plant of major importance.”14
Irving's claim of an industry-weak Dresden is not as holistic as it
seems, as he relents and states that munitions as well as Junker and
V.2 manufacturing firms existed but assures that, “None of these
plants... was within three miles of the city centre, or within the
area marked out for R.A.F. Bomber Command’s two devastating night
attacks.”15
All of these claims were based on evidence from prior to 1963.
Irving
dismisses the official claims of the RAF that it was seen as a major
transport link. Irving believed that, “At the time of the attack,
however, the city’s strategic significance was less than marginal”16
He based his argument on selective evidence at the time which shows
that the raids had minimal impact on the city.
“Rail
transport through the city – the ostensible target of
the raids – had barely suffered, confirmed the police chief.
Although traffic had halted for a few days, by the end of the month
the trains were rolling through again.23
Years later, the east German (Soviet zone) history of
the destruction and reconstruction of Dresden stated: ‘The railroad
lines were not particularly seriously damaged; an emergency service
was able to repair them so swiftly that no significant dislocation of
traffic resulted.’ After referring to the devastation wrought on
the city’s architectural treasures the history continued that ‘in
contrast to these cultural monuments and the entire Dresden inner
city, these transport installations were not destroyed.....”17
Although
the initial damage had cause traffic to halt briefly the rail yards
were unscathed compared to the destruction that had been hoped
according to Irving. However several problems arise in these claims.
His information was based off unreliable Soviet sources and didn't
consider that the result does not make it an illegitimate target, as
Bomber Command had still aimed for them.
The
question of the city's vital infrastructure as being unaffected is
stressed by Alexander
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox in 1982 acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view as his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox in 1982 acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view as his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
The
theory of Dresden as an industrial target is currently lead by
Frederick Taylor who provides it as the reason Dresden was bombed. He
describes the work done by those before him as unjustly causing
“unmitigated shame”23
and queries the nature of Dresden as a industrial city in Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945
saying, “The notion that Dresden, a city of almost three-quarters
of a million hardworking human beings in one of the oldest industrial
regions of Europe, concerned itself only with harmless pottery.”24
Taylor provides evidence that Dresden was a target, “the city of
Dresden contained 127 factories that had bee assigned their own
three-letter manufacturing codes,”25
and using the details of converted factories assumes that, “Dresden
quickly followed the rest of Germany into an integrated war
economy.”26
Cox
supports this stating that:
“Dresden
was ranked at number twenty in the list of the hundred German towns
of leading economic importance to the German war effort......Thus,
although Dresden was 80 percent larger than Chemnitz in terms of
population, the latter's economic importance on this measure was
ranked three places higher at seventeen.”27
Cox
is establishing that Dresden is a significant military target based
on British army intelligence assessments. Dresden was in 1943,
“ranked number twenty..... for economic importance to the German
war effort.”28
This implies that this report was not merely written to give a
legitimate, though fake, excuse for the attack as it.
Grayling
offers a philosophical approach to the legitimacy of the raid from a
moral view point. Grayling makes a clear point about bombing
civilians proffering the idea that, “Allied bombing in the Second
World War was on whole or part morally wrong,”29
challenging the notion that war creates forgivable necessities.
Grayling uses the memo from Winston Churchill's minute on the 28th
of March that stated, “..I feel the need for more precise
concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and
communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than mere
acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.”30
He uses this to show the immediate reactions of Churchill to the
bombing of Dresden which shows that it was a moral issue from the
beginning.
The
bombing of Dresden is likened to the blockade in Hew Strachan's
article, “Strategic Bombing and Civilian Casualties” in which he
shows that both were a part of total war. As such, “It defined not
only what would be required of one's own population, but what one
could inflict on the enemy's.”31
He makes it clear that the WWI blockade was worse than the bomber
campaign as “600,000 died, fewer than were reckoned to have
succumbed to the navy's blockade in the First World War.”32
Strachan makes this statement to highlight that the blockade, “was
not a war crime.” Hence Strachan concludes that Dresden is not
a war crime as contextually the blockade and air offensive had the
same objective of fighting an enemy engaged in total war.
The
actual attack on Dresden was, according to Irving, specifically
significant and different from other bombings. The bomb load was,
“Unlike most of the
air raids on German targets at this stage of the war, the force was
carrying about seventy-five percent incendiaries.”33
This is a phenomenal claim to make but with the restriction of
wartime documents relating to Dresden. Another claim he makes is
that:
“Mustangs concentrated on the river banks, where
masses of bombed out people had gathered. Another section took on the
targets in the Grosser Garten area. These strafing attacks were
apparently designed to perfect the task outlined in the air
commanders’ directives as ‘causing confusion in the civilian
evacuation from the east.’”34
Irving
is claiming that P-51 Mustangs deliberately attacked civilians after
the raids. More importantly he implies that they were under direct
orders from allied high command as they were following the “air
commanders' directives” in carrying out the attack. Irving
substantiates his claims with eye-witness testimonies such as, “The
fighter aircraft came right down and a woman near us suddenly
screamed out, shot in the stomach.”35
and of a Breslau refugee at the Leipziger Strasse rail bridge saying,
“We could hear the aircraft diving low and then they began firing
from all their guns. We
were
fortunate, we were able to crawl into a doorway.”36
Irving does consider the fallibility of memory however and adds as a
side note that “(U.S. Air Force historians have pointed out,
‘Nothing in the records can be found to substantiate such claims,’
and it is only fair to record this.)”37
Kurt Vonnegut in his surreal book
Slaughterhouse
5
exaggerates the heartlessness of the bomber crews stating that,
“...the
widespread use of burning jellied gasoline on human beings. It was
dropped on them from airplanes. Robots did the dropping. They had no
conscience, and had no circuits which would allow them to imagine
what was happening to the people on the ground."38
Vonnegut's
book is heavily influenced by his own context as; a POW during the
raids and of his anti-Vietnam War stance. Vonnegut's context stopped
him consider other perspectives, much ike Irving's conclusions on the
context of the raid.
These
claims have been ridiculed by more modern historians as being
unsubstantial. Cox counters Irving's claim of a higher proportion of
incendiaries as"Despite
claims to the contrary, the proportion of incendiaries carried as a
percentage of the bomb-load was by no means unusual for a Bomber
Command area raid."39
and
bases this off Air Historical Branch papers that show, “Dresden
ranked only tenth in terms of the percentage of incendiaries used
with 44 percent.”40
Cox is able to do this because of the release of Air Ministry
documents after the war's end, something that was unavailable to
Irving and so Cox is correcting past histories.
The
P-51 strafing runs are attacked by Taylor who proves that they are
insubstantial. He shows that the strafing could not have happened
above Dresden as, “the Twentieth Fighter Group was....at the time
more than eighty miles away escorting the attack not against Dresden
but Prague.”41
Taylor continues to attack Irving's claims stating that, “...nor -
perhaps more significantly – in German accounts originating at the
time are such daylight strafing attacks mentioned.”42
This new information was discovered after the Soviet bloc fell and
allowed historians to reveal the true extent of the raids and
progress history on Dresden.
The
most controversial aspect of the debate is the casualty figures and
their implications. David Irving estimated in 1963 that 135,000
people had died in the raids based of a report from Hans Voigt.43
However Irving was forced to retract this statement in latter
editions as, “the author felt bound to submit to The Times an
immediate letter drawing attention
to these new documents...”44
In his 1999 edition he makes a final estimate of, “Sixty thousand
or more; perhaps a hundred thousand – certainly the largest single
air raid massacre of the War in Europe.”45
However Irving contradicts himself over the figures also stating,
“The
night’s death toll in Dresden was estimated to him at a quarter of
a million.”46
These
figures allow Irving to draw comparisons between Hiroshima stating,
“(The
raid was thus comparable with....the atomic bombing of Hiroshima five
months later...”47
and more importantly the holocaust so that he can place Dresden in a
'class' of it's own. This is so he can elicit sympathy for Germans
whilst depicting the Allies as monstrous.
In
his book Hitler's
War and the War Path,
Irving refers to Dresden as, “the
holocaust of Dresden”48
Irving deliberately uses his rhetoric describing the casualty figures
so that they can parallel the status of the holocaust. In a lecture
in 1988 Irving states, “...the biggest lie that we propagated as
far as I can see was the gas chamber lie.”49
Irving at the end of The
Destruction of Dresden
refers to Dresden as “the
worst single massacre in European history.”50
Irving does this to highlight the 'holocaust' brought about on the
Germans in WW2, whilst systematically understating the actual
holocaust.
Alexander
McKee states that the casualty figures, “...might easily be doubled
to 70,000 without much fear of exaggeration. But no one will ever
know for certain.” However this assessment of casualties does not
consider the administrative strain of dealing with a city that
the numbers of refugee equalled or exceeded the original population
(3 quarters of a million).
McKee's figures are based upon Irving's and are dismissed by Taylor
as, “McKee
simply decided to double the number because he didn't think it sound
like enough."
51
McKee's estimations are flawed as they are based upon a lack of
evidence, highlighting the need for empirical sources.
Most
modern historians believe in a much lower casualty figure for the
bombing of Dresden. The current and accepted figures are between
20,000 and 35,000, figures found due to the opening of East German
archives,
“the
definite figure in those documents, (the
Final Report and Situational Report) were between 18,000 and 22,000,
estimates of final numbers around 25,000.....the figures were being
issued as an exceptional measure in order to scotch rumours of
gigantic casualties...”52
The
archives allowed for historians to correct the mistakes of past
writers with new evidence. Taylor describes the argument of other
historians as insisting, “in the face of the documentary
evidence....”53
Michael Burleigh is critical of revisionism on the bomber campaign
and summarises the methodology of Irving and other historians
supporting him, “"....bent on inculpating Allied bomber crews
in war crimes by the not very subtle method of allowing the German
terminology of mass murder to leach into this context."54
The
debate over Dresden has had – and still will – have an impact on
the history of bombing in the Second World War as well as histories
of the Holocaust. This is because it is a rallying point for those
who condemn the Allies for their questionable actions in the war.
However new evidence used by Frederick Taylor has played an
important part in revealing the truth of Dresden whilst David
Irving's preconceptions have had a polar effect. The debate over the
Bombing of Dresden may not be over but one thing is clear, It was a
tragedy, but a necessary tragedy.
1D.
Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden,
Focal Point, 1999, p. 90 (internet edition)
2Irving,
Apocalypse, p. 110
3Ibid.,
p.115 (jet and submarine
.production)
4Ibid.,
p. 79
5F.
Taylor, Dresden
Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury
, 2005, p. 167 (Quoting a Dresden police officer.)
6Ibid.,
p. 222
7Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
8S.
Cox, The Dresden Raids: Why and How in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.),
Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 19
9Ibid.,
p. 20
10Ibid.,
p. 20
11Ibid.,
p. 20
12A.C.
Grayling, Amongst the Dead Cities the history and moral legacy of
the WWII bombings of civilians in Germany and Japan,
Walker & Company, 2006, p. 73
13Irving,
op. Cit, p. 91
14Ibid.,
p. 91
15Ibid.,
p. 92
16Ibid.,
p. 93
17Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
19Ibid.,
p. 70
20Ibid.,
p. 70
21Ibid.,
p. 10
22Ibid.,
p. 11
23Taylor,
op. Cit, p. xi
24Ibid.,
p. xii
25Ibid.,
p. 169
26Ibid.,
p.170
27Cox,
op. Cit, pp. 54-55
28Cox,
op. Cit, p. 53
29Grayling,
op. Cit, p. 5
30Ibid.,
p. 175
31H.
Strachan, Strategic Bombing and Civilian Questions in P Addison and
JA Crang (ed.), Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 2
32Ibid.,
p. 17
33Irving,
op. Cit, p. 173
34Ibid.,
p. 237
35Irving,
op. Cit, p. 237
36Ibid.,
p. 238
37Ibid.,
p. 237
38K.
Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5,
Vintage, 2000, p. 138 (originally published 1969, New York)
39Cox,
op. Cit., p. 31
40Ibid.,
p. 223 (end notes)
41Taylor,
op. Cit, p. 491
42Ibid.,
p. 494
43Ibid.,
p. 504
44Irving.,
op. Cit, p.289
45Ibid.,
p.289
46D.
Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path,
Focal Point, 2002, p.789
47Ibid.,
p.289
48Irving,
HW at WP, op. Cit, p.
796
49http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTFDLYxh1KU,
viewed: 25/08/2012, 27:06
50Irving,
Destruction, op. Cit,
p. 324
51Taylor,
op. Cit, p. 507
52Ibid.,
p. 505-6
53Ibid.,
p. 506
54M.
Burleigh, Moral Combat: A history of World War II,
HarperPress, 2010,
pp. x-xi
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