Essay Update

 The debate of bombing of Dresden can be split into two contemporary fields. The first is dominated by David Irving (The Destruction of Dresden), Alexander McKee (Dresden 1945, The ' Tinderbox)and Kurt Vonnegut (Slaughterhouse 5) who argue the terrible and horrendous crime of the bombing. The other field is made up primarily led by Frederick Taylor (Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945) but also includes others such as Sebastian Cox (Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945) and Hew Strachan (Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945). Four key areas can be identified as being cases for major debate work; the contextual view of the raid, the legitimacy of Dresden as a target, the legitimacy of the method which the city was bombed and casualty figures of the raid.

The concept of Dresden as a contextual oddity stems from the belief that by February 1945 World War II was over. Dresden was long considered a target that was destroyed by just a single air raid, chosen at a time when the war was winding down and Irving makes the bold claim that Dresden was “The Virgin Target” in The Destruction of Dresden as a chapter name. This is done to further highlight the contextual contrast between the bombing of Dresden and the rest of the bomber war. Irving doesn't ignore other raids on the city but minimizes their impact and severity, stating, “The local inhabitants unanimously agreed among themselves that the bombing was the result of some unfortunate oversight by an allied navigator.”¹

The above quote fits the other contextual problem that Dresden poses. Irving argues that Dresden was bombed in the last moments of World War II. Irving forgets to mention the Ardennes offensive, one of the main reasons for the renewed bomber offensive. The best he mentions is that, “When Stalin had failed to launch his major winter offensive during Hitler’s attack in the Ardennes, the Allies had sent to Moscow Eisenhower’s deputy.”² Irving downplays the seriousness of the war, acknowledging the existence and impact of Schnorkel submarines or the ME-262 but fails to see the affect they would have on the Allied strategy.³ Irving understates the context of the time to fit his goal of creating guilt in the British psyche and at the same time making a world sympathetic to Germany. This is seen in his many negative portrayals of Arthur Harris, calling him at on point “'butcher' Harris.”⁴

Dresden is shown as an attack warranted by it's context in Frederick Taylor's book, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945. Frederick Taylor emphasizes the importance and magnitude of the previous raids. Taylor emphasizes the previous raids to show that the populace did in fact expect a raid and that the final bombing was consistent with other cities. He describes the first raid on August 24^th, 1944 as being the reason “'Trust in the leadership is diminishing rapidly.'”⁵ Taylor also describes the second raid on the in a similar manner to further his idea that Dresden was not a surprise for the populace as, “This was the 111^th raid alarm of the war...... the trek down to into the shelter was not to be in vain.”⁶and the much heavier raid on the January 16^th which killed over 300 people illustrate that Dresden had been a target for a much longer time than Irving suggested.⁷

Sebastian Cox, in his chapter of Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 titled The Dresden Raids: Why and How puts the raids into political and military context. Cox offers interesting insights into the context raid, describing the gloomy atmosphere of the Allied High Command at the time and potential reasons why.

"....the heady hopes of optimism of the previous summer had been replaced by a distinctly chill air of pessimism. This pessimism was the result of the failure of the Arnhem airborne landings (Operation Garden Market) and the subsequent ability of the German Army to deliver a further temporary, if at the time deeply worrying, reverse to the Allies during the Ardennes offensive. These events suggested strongly that the German capacity for resistance was as yet very far from being overcome.”⁸

The Allies, who had to face the Wehrmact's continued defiance despite the inevitability of defeat. The notion that the war was to soon end in Europe is dispelled by Cox, the Ardennes offensive, along with the failure of Operation Garden Market, exasperated the frailty of Allied High Command's hope in a quick victory. Cox shows further problems faced by Allied High Command by highlighting the “...the grave danger the jet fighters posed”⁹ and “a renewed maritime threat, in the form of schnorkel-equipped submarines had arisen.”¹⁰ These factors of a new and reinvigorated war, at least to the Allied commanders in January 1945 meant it was “possible that both air and naval supremacy might yet be challenged by German technological ingenuity."

1D. Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden, Focal Point, 1999, p. 90 (internet edition)

2Irving, Apocalypse, p. 110

3Ibid., p.115 (jet and submarine .production)

4Ibid., p. 79

5F. Taylor, Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury , 2005, p. 167 (Quoting a Dresden police officer.)

6Ibid., p. 222

7Ibid., pp. 230-231

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