With
Reference to David Irving, Frederick Taylor and other relevant
historians and writers, Discuss the different perspectives in the
debate of the Bombing of Dresden.
The
concept of Dresden as a contextual oddity stems from the belief that
by February 1945 World War II was over. Dresden was long considered a
target that was destroyed by just a single air raid, chosen at a time
when the war was winding down and Irving makes the bold claim that
Dresden was “The Virgin Target” in The Destruction of
Dresden as a chapter name. This
is done to further highlight the contextual contrast between the
bombing of Dresden and the rest of the bomber war. Irving
doesn't ignore other raids on the city but minimizes their impact and
severity,
stating, “The
local inhabitants unanimously agreed among themselves
that the bombing was the result of some unfortunate oversight by an
allied navigator.”1
The
above quote fits the other contextual problem that Dresden poses.
Irving argues that Dresden was bombed in the last moments of World
War II. Irving forgets to mention the Ardennes offensive, one of the
main reasons for the renewed bomber offensive. The best he mentions
is that, “When Stalin had failed to launch his major winter
offensive during Hitler’s attack in the Ardennes, the Allies had
sent to Moscow Eisenhower’s deputy.”2
Irving downplays the seriousness of the war, acknowledging the
existence and impact of Schnorkel submarines or the ME-262 but fails
to see the affect they would have on the Allied strategy.3
Irving understates the context of the time to fit his goal of
creating guilt in the British psyche and at the same time making a
world sympathetic to Germany. This is seen in his many negative
portrayals of Arthur Harris, calling him at on point “'butcher'
Harris.”4
Dresden
is shown as an attack warranted by it's context in Frederick Taylor's
book, Dresden:
Tuesday 13 February 1945.
Frederick Taylor emphasizes the importance and magnitude of the
previous raids.
Taylor emphasizes the previous raids to show that the populace did in
fact expect a raid and that the final bombing was consistent with
other cities. He describes the first raid on August 24th,
1944 as being the reason “'Trust in the leadership is diminishing
rapidly.'”5
Taylor also describes the second raid on the in a similar manner to
further his idea that Dresden was not a surprise for the populace as,
“This was the 111th
raid alarm of the war...... the trek down to into the shelter was not
to be in vain.”6and
the much heavier raid on the January 16th
which killed over 300 people illustrate that Dresden had been a
target for a much longer time than Irving suggested.7
Sebastian
Cox, in his chapter of Firestorm:
The Bombing of Dresden, 1945
titled The
Dresden Raids: Why and How
puts the raids into political and military context. Cox offers
interesting insights into the context raid, describing the gloomy
atmosphere of the Allied High Command at the time and potential
reasons why.
"....the
heady hopes of optimism of the previous summer had been replaced by a
distinctly chill air of pessimism. This pessimism was the result of
the failure of the Arnhem airborne landings (Operation
Garden Market) and
the subsequent ability of the German Army to deliver a further
temporary, if at the time deeply worrying, reverse to the Allies
during the Ardennes offensive. These events suggested strongly that
the German capacity for resistance was as yet very far from being
overcome.”8
The
Allies,
who had to face the Wehrmact's continued defiance despite the
inevitability of defeat. The notion that the war was to soon end in
Europe is dispelled by Cox, the Ardennes offensive, along with the
failure of Operation Garden Market, exasperated the frailty of Allied
High Command's hope in a quick victory.
Cox shows further problems faced by Allied High Command by
highlighting the “...the grave danger the jet fighters posed”9
and “a
renewed maritime threat, in the form of schnorkel-equipped submarines
had arisen.”10
These factors of a new and reinvigorated war, at least to the Allied
commanders in January 1945 meant it was “possible that both air and
naval supremacy might yet be challenged by German technological
ingenuity."11
Cox's argument against Irving places emphasis of using 'Sentient
Empathy' to understand the nature of the raid and why it occurred.
David
Irving made a poignant case In 1963 that Dresden was not a military
target, referred to by A.C Grayling as”seemingly arbitrary
attacks.”12
He presents Dresden as being a weakly defended city, economically
based on, “theatres,
museums, cultural institutions and home-industries.”13
and that they were impossible to spot by air, “...it would have
been hard to single out any one plant of major importance.”14
Irving's claim of a industry-weak Dresden is not as holistic as it
seems, as he relents and states that munitions as well as Junker and
V.2 manufacturing firms but assures that, “None of these plants...
was within three miles of the city centre, or within the area marked
out for R.A.F. Bomber Command’s two devastating night attacks.”15
All of these claims were based on evidence from prior to 1963
Irving
dismisses the official claims of the RAF that it was seen as a major
transport link. Irving believed that, “At the time of the attack,
however, the city’s strategic significance was less than
marginal”16
he based on the evidence at the time which shows that the raids had
minimal impact on the city.
“Rail
transport through the city – the ostensible
target of the raids – had barely suffered, confirmed the police
chief. Although traffic had halted for a few days, by the end of the
month the trains were rolling through again.23
Years later, the east German (Soviet zone) history of
the destruction and reconstruction of Dresden stated: ‘The railroad
lines were not particularly seriously damaged; an emergency service
was able to repair them so swiftly that no significant dislocation of
traffic resulted.’ After referring to the devastation wrought on
the city’s architectural treasures the history continued that ‘in
contrast to these cultural monuments and the entire Dresden inner
city, these transport installations were not destroyed.....”17
Although
the initial damage had cause traffic to halt briefly the rail yards
were unscathed compared to the destruction that had been hoped
according to Irving. However several problems arise in these claims.
His information is based off unreliable Soviet sources and does not
consider that the result does not make it a legitimate target, as
Bomber Command had still aimed for them.
The
question of the cities vital infrastructure as being unaffected is
stressed by Alexander
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox in 1982 acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were but they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view as his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
McKee. McKee in his book Dresden 1945, The Devil's Tinderbox in 1982 acknowledges that although the marshaling yards and train works were important they were but they were not the target. “In my view Dresden had been bombed for political reasons and not military reasons; but again, without effect. There was misery, but it did not affect the war.”18 He insists that they could not have been the target because of the Nazi built Autobahns, “But the main road route to the Front was carried by the Hitler-built Autobahn which crossed the river Elbe outside the city limits entirely to the west.”19 He instead offers his view that, “What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure.20 These show that McKee presents a sensationalistic view as his first words are “Dresden was a famous massacre from the start.”21 McKee's context as a Allied foot soldier is prevalent, “ I only saw a dozen or so buildings which were intact....there was a peculiar smell.....The smell of human flesh, long dead, decomposing in the heat.”22 This affects his argument as to whether it was a legitimate question as he is unable to consider the perspective of Bomber Command or the bomber crews.
1D.
Irving, Apocalypse 1945 The Destruction of Dresden,
Focal Point, 1999, p. 90 (internet edition)
2Irving,
Apocalypse, p. 110
3Ibid.,
p.115 (jet and submarine
.production)
4Ibid.,
p. 79
5F.
Taylor, Dresden
Tuesday 13 February 1945, Bloomsbury
, 2005, p. 167 (Quoting a Dresden police officer.)
6Ibid.,
p. 222
7Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
8S.
Cox, The Dresden Raids: Why and How in P Addison and JA Crang (ed.),
Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, 1945,
Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 19
9Ibid.,
p. 20
10Ibid.,
p. 20
11Ibid.,
p. 20
12A.C.
Grayling, Amongst the Dead Cities the history and moral legacy of
the WWII bombings of civilians in Germany and Japan,
Walker & Company, 2006, p. 73
13Irving,
op. Cit, p. 91
14Ibid.,
p. 91
15Ibid.,
p. 92
16Ibid.,
p. 93
17Ibid.,
pp. 230-231
19Ibid.,
p. 70
20Ibid.,
p. 70
21Ibid.,
p. 10
22Ibid.,
p. 11
No comments:
Post a Comment